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starting with images, emotions and impulses as data, retains these in part in the final synthesis. A man's relation to his gods is dramatic, therefore the need in the student of religious sympathy, which is appropriately compared to dramatic appreciation. Three stages may be traced that are common to the two attitudes: (a) sympathetic imitation, (b) critical reaction and (c) resulting mood or emotional disposition.

Among mystical ideals purporting quite to transcend the personal and social levels, some account is given of beliefs of the Iroquois, Africans, Greeks and Hindus. The magic power of the *word* is dwelt upon if not clearly interpreted. The importance of mysticism is found in its attempt to fix a single principle and standard of values, but the relations of such a universal to the particular facts and values of experience (whether transcendent or immanent, organizing and representative, and how so) are not made clear: that is, the question of the manner of the concrete use of the principle, especially if it be an empty and absolute universal, is hardly suggested.

The features of the complete religion are indicated. It will contain all three levels of value: (1) the personal, (2) the social and (3) the metaphysical. There are three great types of religion on the metaphysical level: (a) ascetic mysticism, exemplified by Vedantism, (b) social mysticism, as in Buddhism, and (c) historic mysticism, Christianity. In (a) the end is an abstract ecstasy excluding the two lower levels; in (b), while ecstasy is reached by absorption, it is still to have a function in the social world; in (c) only are all three levels of value present in essential unity.

The book is, of course, a suggestive sketch of a point of view and method for solving religious problems rather than itself an embodiment of such a method or system. For the latter its data are too scant and its touch too light. Moreover, the employment of logical, ethical and metaphysical categories is so frequent and so apparently *a priori* as almost to belie the author's initial appeal to the standards of inductive inquiry. There is present also a lack of clearness and incisiveness in the concepts which are described as involved in religious experience, and in their relations to each other, contradictory or otherwise, *e. g.*, the universal and particular, judgment and feeling. The reader feels himself sometimes on shifting sand when he looks to deal with a clearly developed dialectic. Two of the most valuable suggestions the book contains are (1) its attempt to determine the relative value of religious experience by the types of judgment clearly implied in the experience and (2) its emphasis on the need of a sympathetic and dramatic interpretation of religious experience.

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*Das Weltproblem von positivistischem Standpunkte aus.* JOSEPH PETZOLDT. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1906. Pp. x+152.

This little volume is a very interesting contribution to the history of positivism. The general point of view of the book is that with which

students of Avenarius have already been made familiar. It is another attempt to solve *Das Weltproblem* by an appeal to the autocratic and final evidence of immediate experience. The greater part of the volume is taken up with a sketch of the history of philosophy, in which the author passes in review the familiar landmarks in the history of thought from Thales to Kant. There is one criticism which the author makes upon every previous system he examines. The disparagement of the world of our immediate experience as a realm of "mere appearance," and the exaltation of a second, purely imaginary world to the rank of reality, this, Dr. Petzoldt contends, is the "miserable mistake" that philosophers have made from the time of the earliest Greek sages to the present day. It is the "original sin" which is responsible for the fall of philosophic man. The search for a permanent and ultimate material underlying all things as their substance is the pursuit of an *ignis fatuus*. It stands on the same level with the search for the philosopher's stone or for perpetual motion. This is what the author calls the *empirical fallacy* of the earlier Greek physiologists, a fallacy which has been slavishly perpetuated for twenty-five centuries. And again, the search for an absolute in thought, a unifying principle for the manifold of consciousness, is what Petzoldt calls the *logical fallacy* of the earlier Greek metaphysicians. This fallacy, too, has been perpetuated, even more persistently and slavishly. Metaphysics and epistemology are merely later-day refinements of the mythological tendencies of the childhood of our race.

Petzoldt frankly confesses that in his system he has once more returned to a point of view closely resembling that of the naïve realism of the plain man. The resemblance is very close at two important points. In the immediate experience of the object, without any further transforming or transcending step, we have reality. Our immediate experiences of the object are not merely projections of subjective sensation complexes out beyond which reality is conceived as lying. These immediate experiences of ours are themselves ultimate reality.

Following Avenarius, Schuppe and Mach, he says there is "no world in itself, only a world for us." He explains at great length that he means by this assertion something quite different from subjective idealism, Berkeleyanism, or Kantian idealism. In all these systems there is a tacit or overt recognition of that which transcends our immediate experience. The "*esse is percipi*" points always to something beyond subjective experience, for Berkeley held that sense perception is the language of God. Petzoldt insists that Berkeley and the later idealists have "erred in thinking that they could annihilate matter and still keep the correlative concept of mind." If everything is immaterial we can no longer point to anything that is material, and therefore the immaterial in Berkeley's system loses its meaning, for it has significance only in correlation with the material. Mind and matter stand in a necessary correlation. The idea needs the object, quite as much as the object needs the idea.

Every one will admit that this is a proper criticism upon Berkeley's

immaterialism. Berkeley was, in the end, a sensationalist and not a thoroughgoing idealist. But it must be pointed out as a counter criticism upon Petzoldt that his fundamental position is also the starting-point for many systems of transcendental idealism. One need not read far in current idealistic systems to find other thinkers starting from this same doctrine of the inseparable correlation of the psychical and the physical world. But while in the positivism of Petzoldt these inseparably correlated worlds are regarded as the ultimate and only reality, representative idealism insists that we are here still in the realm of appearance. Reality has suffered a transformation in order to manifest this correlation. Ultimate reality lies deeper than either of these two realms. It is the world of undifferentiated values that transcends the contrast between the psychical and the physical world.

Dr. Petzoldt shows his close affiliation with pragmatism in many passages. "Thought is really a biological function. That which can not be logically maintained is also that which biologically has been left behind." This is the crucial question which Petzoldt asks of every philosophy that sets up an absolute over against the relative: "How is this world of appearances, which after all is here and furthermore is under the reign of law, related to that real world?"

Idealists will say that Petzoldt's attempt to make experience self-explanatory is open to precisely the same objections that have always been made to empiricism in whatever form it has manifested itself in the history of philosophy; but they will all welcome his little volume as one of the most important and original contributions to the present pragmatic movement.

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*Kinesthetic and Organic Sensations: Their Rôle in the Reactions of the White Rat to the Maze.* JOHN B. WATSON. *Psychological Review*, Monograph Supplements, Volume 8, No. 2 (Whole No. 33), May, 1907. Pp. vi+100.

This paper gives an account of some admirably exact and well-controlled experimental work. In reviewing the content of the monograph I shall first call attention to certain matters of form which seem to me worthy of consideration, and I shall then give a résumé of the important results which the author has presented.

The style of the paper, unfortunately, has many weaknesses. Among them those which must imperatively demand adverse criticism are ambiguity, inappropriate words, and the use of colloquial and slang expressions. That these statements may have the support of instances in point, I quote from the monograph the following examples of the defects which have just been mentioned. On pages 57-58 we read, with extreme discomfort if not with uncertainty regarding the author's meaning, "These results from the experiments on the defective rats confirm those obtained by Dr. Carr and ourselves upon the normal trained rats